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Introduction 
A fixed link between Denmark and Germany was agreed upon by the Danish and 
German governments on June 30 2007. The bridge (probably preferred to a tun-
nel) will cross the Fehmarn Belt between Rødby in Denmark and Puttgarden on 
the island of Fehmarn, in Schleswig-Holstein in Germany, a span of 20 kilome-
tres. The bridge will be finished by 2017. 
The agreement was reached after more than 10 years period of investigations and 
negotiations on technical, environmental and not least financial aspects. Different 
models from private financing and ownership over a number of PPP’s (Public-
Private Partnership) were reviewed until a full state financed model was agreed 
upon – a model where the Danish State will pay, build and operate the bridge. 
The German contribution will be the land connections on the German side – 
around 40 kilometres of highway to connect the bridge with the ‘Autobahn’-
system and the upgrading and electrification of the 90 kilometres of single  rail 
track from Puttgarden to Lübeck. If railway traffic seven years after the opening of 
the bridge (i.e. 2024) exceeds a certain limit (80 trains a day has been mentioned) 
the Germans will start constructing a second rail track. 
On Danish soil the construction will mainly be an upgrading of the rail from Co-
penhagen to Rødby. Between Copenhagen and Ringsted new track is already be-
ing planned, and from Ringsted to Rødby the existing single, non-electrified track 
has to be doubled and electrified. However, across the old 3,5 kilometre 
Storestrømsbro there will only be single track. 
The decision to build a fixed link is of course founded on thorough traffic fore-
casts (Wätjen 2003) and economic calculations (Sund & Bælt Holding A/S 2003) 
and has by the Danish government been characterised as a ‘very good business 
investment’, that will not burden the public finances (Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen at a press briefing, February 20, 2007). 
In this paper the impacts of a fixed link on road freight transport has been stud-
ied. The results differ somewhat from what has been found in the traffic forecast 
studies, and this divergence is being discussed. 
Learning from Øresund 
The present study was initiated by a curiosity to find out how a finished fixed link 
would actually influence logistics in general (Drewes Nielsen et al. 2003) and es-
pecially the routing decisions made by the hauliers. This curiosity came from the 
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observations made after the opening of the fixed Øresund connection between 
Denmark and Sweden in 2000. The traffic forecasts had overshot actual road 
traffic by more than 40%  (Øresundsbro Konsortiet 2001) and for years a bank-
ruptcy was feared. First in 2005 the actual traffic exceeded the initial forecast. 
Now, however, the increase in road traffic is very significant with annual increase 
of around15%. 
The explanation to this phenomenon is that the bridge potentially accommodates 
two types of road traffic, namely regional traffic between the metropolitan areas of 
Copenhagen and Malmö, and international transport between the European con-
tinent and Sweden, Norway and Finland. 
Whereas there is no competition for the regional traffic, the international traffic 
has several options, the most important one being the ferry connection between 
Elsinore and Helsingborg (4 kilometres, 20 minutes), north of the Øresund fixed 
connection. This connection was regarded as threatened by the fixed link, and in 
the agreement between Denmark and Sweden on the Øresund fixed link there 
actually is an obligation to uphold this ferry for reasons of local development.  
However, what actually happened was, that the two car ferry companies operating 
on Elsinore-Helsingborg adjusted their prices, so that they were competitive to 
the fixed connection.  
In the map (Figure 1) the blue dotted line designates the iso-time curve for 
trucks, the points on the curve being accessible in the same time by the fixed 
connection and the ferry connection if the starting point is south and west of Co-
penhagen2. Of the major population centres in Sweden, only Malmö is faster ac-
cessible by the fixed connections. The two main road freight arteries of Sweden, 
E4 to Stockholm and E6 xxx to Gothenburg have faster connection by the ferry 
route. 
Looking at costs for the hauliers, the adjustment of the ferry prices, including the 
extra reimbursements given to large customers3 have resulted in an iso-cost4 
curve very similar to the iso-time curve.  
This explains the development in the road  freight traffic across the Øresund fixed 
connection – for the international long-distance traffic it was neither economically 
feasible nor was it attractive for express types of delivery. The same thing is 
probably true for passenger transport, even though this has not been docu-
mented. 
                                       
2 Measured by Microsoft Autoroute, taking into account the expected waiting time by the ferry if 
random arrival time. 
3 These rebates are not public, but have been revealed to the author to be up to 50% of the official 
list price. 
4 Costs have been calculated on the TransIT-system of the Danish international hauliers’ associa-
tion, ITD, for a truck wit a non-refrigerated trailer, www.itd.dk. TransIT is offered to hauliers to 
help them calculate costs. The numbers used are from 2004. Since then there have been no fun-
damental changes in the price structure except for a 20% price reduction at the Great Belt con-
nection. 
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Thus the traffic across the fixed connection is thus mainly regional and local traf-
fic, and the growth rates of this transport thus demonstrates the potentials of the 
integration of Copenhagen and Malmö. 
 
 
Potentials of the Fehmarn Belt fixed connection 
The same methodology for cost estimation was used to evaluate the potentials of 
a Fehmarn Belt fixed connections. In the process up to the decision, it has been 
assumed that the prices for crossing the fixed connection should be the same as 
the prices for using the present ferry connection. 
The competition situation on the Baltic Sea is, however, quite complex. In addi-
tion to a number of ferries Denmark/Sweden to Germany/Poland there is also 
the option of going across the Great Belt fixed connection through Jutland to 
Germany. 
For the further investigation the six routes shown in Table 1 have been taken into 
consideration. 
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Route Length / Sailing time 
Fehmarn Belt fixed connection  19 kms 
Great Belt fixed connection 18 kms 
Trelleborg (S) – Sassnitz (D) ferry 3½ hrs 
Trelleborg (S) – Rostock (D) ferry 5½ hrs 
Gedser (DK) – Rostock (D) ferry 2 hrs 
Rødby (DK) – Puttgarden (D) ferry ¾ hr 
 
Routes to Poland as well as a 
number of smaller routes 
have not been regarded. The 
Rødby-Puttgarden ferry is 
included in the study in or-
der to see if a continuation of 
the ferry operations would be 
suitable even with a parallel 
fixed connection5. To give a 
more complete picture also 
the Øresund fixed connection 
(Øresund B) and the ferries 
Elsinore-Helsingborg (Elsi-
nore-Helsingborg F) must be 
taken into account. The 
routes are shown in the map 
of Figure 2. 
The results can be catego-
rized as shown in the map of 
Figure 3. Both the origins 
and destinations fall in three 
categories – in Scandinavia 
most of Sweden and Norway 
(A), the South Eastern part of 
Sweden (B) and the Copenhagen area (C), in continental most of Western Europe 
(I), the central corridor of Nuremburg, Munich and Brenner (II) and Eastern 
Europe, including Eastern Germany (III).  
Two scenarios have been made – the first assuming that all prices for using fer-
ries and fixed links are constant (using 2004 prices), the second that de facto 
prices of ferries can be reduced 50%. 
                                       
5 After the opening of the Great Belt fixed link connecting Denmark internally, a ferry operation 
parallel to the bridge targeted toward the truck segment continued. It was however closed down 
after a few months. 
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In the first scenario, the 
Full price scenario, the 
cheapest overall costs are 
obtained for the origin-
destination combinations 
shown in table 2, which 
also shows the advantage 
of using the fixed connec-
tion with respect to dis-
tance, time used and cost.  
Corridor I II III 
A 
Elsinore F + 
Great Belt B 
+154 kms 
+2,0 hrs 
-14 € 
Trelleborg-
Sassnitz F 
-144 kms 
+2,3 hrs 
-40 € 
Trelleborg-
Sassnitz F 
-225 kms 
+1,4 hrs 
-83 € 
B 
Øresund B + 
Great Belt B 
+157 kms 
+2,1 hrs 
-13 € 
Trelleborg-
Sassnitz F 
-190 kms 
+2,4 hrs 
-31 € 
Trelleborg-
Sassnitz F 
-274 kms 
+1,5 hrs 
-75 € 
C 
Great Belt B 
+157 kms 
+2,0 hrs 
-13 € 
Great Belt B 
+165 kms 
+2,2 hrs 
-8 € 
Fehmarn Belt B 
0 kms 
0 hrs 
0 € 
 
Only for the corridor between Copenhagen and Western Europe, the lowest truck-
ing costs are obtained by using the Fehmarn Belt fixed link, so in this scenario 
none of the traffic between Sweden and Germany would have the new bridge as 
its preferred connection. Of course, if time values of the freight increases e.g. due 
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to express deliveries or delays, the fastest route will in all cases be the Fehmarn 
Belt fixed link, but in normal preplanned operations this will look different. 
In the second scenario, the Competitive pricing scenario, it is assumed that the 
ferry companies – or actually the ferry company, as Scandlines at present operate 
by far the most of the routes – are able to maintain profitability, even though they 
reduced the prices to 50% of the present list prices for high volume customers.  
In this case the most cost effective corridor of the nine corridors is as seen in Ta-
ble 3: 
Corridor I II III 
A 
Elsinore F + 
Fehmarn Belt F 
-19 kms 
+0,9 hrs 
-86 € 
Trelleborg-
Sassnitz F  
-144 kms 
+2,3 hrs 
-147 € 
Trelleborg-
Sassnitz F 
-225 kms 
+1,4 hrs 
-190 € 
B 
Øresund B + 
Fehmarn Belt F 
-19 kms 
+0,9 hrs 
-64 € 
Trelleborg-
Sassnitz F  
-190 kms 
+2,4 hrs 
-158 € 
Trelleborg-
Sassnitz F  
-271 kms 
+1,5 hrs 
-201 € 
C 
Fehmarn Belt F 
-19 kms 
+1,0 hrs 
-64 € 
Gedser-Rostock F 
-143 kms 
+1,3 hrs 
-121 € 
Gedser-Rostock F 
-155 kms 
+0,8 hrs 
-130 € 
 
In this scenario it seems as if a continued ferry connection between Rødby and 
Puttgarden with tickets at half price would be able to offer the lowest cost solu-
tion for all connections west of the old Iron Curtain. The time difference between 
using the bridge and the parallel ferry (15 minutes versus 65 minutes) cannot 
justify the price difference of 60 €. 
Whether this competition will actually take place is anybodies guess. The parallel 
to the situation when the Great Belt fixed link was opened is not too obvious. The 
ferry company that operated on Great Belt was a small company with few re-
sources. Scandlines is a large company operating many routes and being able to 
put large resources into the competition if they think they can reach a long term 
profit.  
Conclusion 
It seems that the expected attraction of the fixed connection over Fehmarn Belt 
stipulated in the official reports is somewhat overestimated. The fixed connection 
will apparently not be the main connection between Scandinavia and Germany. 
The cost-benefit analysis made (COWI & Danmarks Transportforskning 2004) 
uses a methodology were transport costs are taken into account, and time values 
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of freight is not because of lack of knowledge, which would be less detailed than 
the approach used here, but should not fundamentally differ in its outcome.  
However, in assessing the potential of the competing ferry companies the report 
says (p. 134):  
This follows an assumption that the ferries operate under full competition 
and that the ferry companies cannot earn more than normal profits, and that 
this will not change by the establishment of a fixed connection over Fehmarn 
Belt. Effects of a reduced monopolistic pricing of the ferries is thus not con-
sidered6. 
This seems like a rather questionable assumption. The immediate observation is  
that Scandlines actually has a very dominating position in the ferry operations of 
the Western Baltic Sea – of the regarded ferries only on the Trelleborg-Rostock 
route, Scandlines is in competition with another operator.  
Lessons from Øresund (and also the Channel Tunnel) should advice caution. 
Even if the profits of Scandlines would not be monopolistic, the abilities of the 
company to align service level and market segment to keep a profitable service is 
probably substantial, and has to be lookes upon much more thoroughly. 
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6 The Danish wording is: ”Dette følger af en antagelse om, at færgerne opererer 
under fuldkommen konkurrence og, at færgeselskaberne derfor ikke kan tjene 
overnormale profitter, samt at dette ikke ændres ved etablering af en fast forbin-
delse over Femern Bælt. Der ses således bort fra eventuelle effekter af en reduce-
ret monopolistisk prissætning hos færgerne.” 
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